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CHAPTER! OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
With the deregulation of power market, increase of loads, limited investment in new facilities, 
power systems are becoming more and more stressed. Thus the most economic operation of the power 
system in terms of energy production is not always possible due to actual or potential transmission 
problems. Avoidance of these problems requires judicious selection of corrective (for actual problems) 
and preventive (for potential problems) actions, The objective of this work is to develop a decision-
making method for selecting preventive and corrective actions on the basis of risk posed by these 
problems. 
In the approach developed, risk, as the expected value of impact, is used to quantify the danger 
associated with the transmission problem. Risk considers two aspects of different events of power 
systems: impact and probability. Impact quantifies the severity of different events and probability 
quantifies the likelihood that an event will happen. The risk of a component reflects whether the 
component is running securely while the total risk of a power system can be used as an index to reflect 
the security level of the system. 
When the value of risk ( of components or system) is high, preventive or corrective action should be 
taken to lower it and thus enhance the security through actuation of a limited number of controls. Thus 
the selection of appropriate controls is very important. To find efficient controls to reduce the risk, risk 
sensitivity and operation reserve can provide useful information. In this work, risk sensitivities and 
some heuristic rules are used to decide the appropriate controls. 
Because economy and security are the two main objectives of power system operation and because 
they are always in conflict with each other, the problem of implementation of preventive and corrective 
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actions is essentially a multi-criterion decision making problem. In this work, different multi-criterion 
decision-making methods are discussed. Some of them are applied to determine the preventive and 
corrective actions that achieve an optimal tradeoff between the two conflicting objectives. 
1.2 Power System Security Problem 
In order to express power system security clearly, we explain a closely related term - reliability 
before that. Reliability is an inherent characteristic and a specific measure of any component, device or 
system that describes its ability to perform its function. In normal usage, reliability is closely related 
with the avoidance of failure. Power system engineers have more specifically defined it in terms that are 
useful to them. 
According to the widely recognized North American Electrical Reliability Council (NERC) 
Planning Standards [38], power system reliability is defined using the terms of "adequacy" and 
"security". 
"Adequacy- The ability of the electric systems to supply the aggregate electrical demand and 
energy requirements of their customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably 
expected unscheduled outages of system elements" 
"Security-The ability of the electric systems to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric 
short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements." 
Power system security problems can be classified as static and dynamic security problems. Static 
security problems consist of overload, low voltage. Overload is caused by excessive current flow in a 
circuit. The conductor will be overheated if the current flow is out of limit. Due to thermal expansion, 
the conductor can lose life by annealing process, or it can sag and in some cases short to some high 
objects, which may cause serious impact on the power system. Voltage security includes low voltage 
and voltage instability. Voltages below the operational limits at certain buses will affect customers. It 
will do damage to various electrical appliances such as refrigerators, television, bulbs, audio systems 
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and industrial products like motors and small transformers. Dynamic security comprises voltage 
instability and transient instability. Voltage instability happens when the power system cannot meet the 
demand for reactive power. At this time, a disturbance, increases in load demand, or change in system 
condition may cause a progressive and uncontrolled drop in voltage. Transient instability happens when 
the power system cannot maintain synchronism between its parts when subjected to a contingency. 
1.3 Traditional Control Room Security-Economy Decision Making 
As power systems are exposed to various security problems, operators in the control room often 
need to make decisions on whether to take actions for the sake of security, and if yes, what actions to 
take considering both security and economy. Security assessment is one important and necessary part 
of that decision process and substantial research has been done on the topic. 
In security assessment, efforts are made to classify the power system operating states in terms of the 
degree to which security constraints are satisfied. Fink and Carlsen [ 1] proposed the first classification 
of power system operating states in 1978. The scheme was modified several times since then [39,40]. 
Recently, Marceau and Endrenyi [41] proposed a comprehensive classification in Figure 1. 
In the normal state, all operational constraints are within limits and any credible contingency will 
not result in a limit being violated. A credible contingency, a change in generation schedule, or a growth 
in the system load may lead the power system to an alert state, in which all the constraints are satisfied, 
but some credible contingencies can cause some operational violations. The operational violations will 
send the power system to one of the following emergency states. In the temporary emergency state, 
some operator actions can send back the system to the normal state or the alert state. For the controlled 
emergency state, remedial action is possible only if load is shed. Some contingencies in an alert state 
will also interrupt the supply directly and send the system into the controlled emergency state. In this 
kind of emergency state, the power system remains stable and integral. Other contingencies in an alert 
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state will send the power system into extreme emergency state in which the stability and integrity of the 
system are threatened. The power system will also transfer to the extreme emergency state when no 
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Figure 1-1 : The process of power system operation 
appropriate operations are taken in the temporary emergency state. 
Traditionally, power systems always run in the normal state, in which all adequacy and security 
constraints·are satisfied. When a power system is in the alert state, preventive actions may be necessary 
to move the system to the normal state. When a power system is in the temporary or controlled 
emergency state, corrective actions should be taken to move the system to the alert state, in which a 
decision need to be made on whether further preventive actions need to be implemented to move the 
system to the normal state. 
Security assessment in operations is performed in two stages. Operational planning engineers study 
expected future conditions off-line to identify operating rules. Operators then utilize these rules together 
with EMS security assessment software to assess system security levels and make decisions regarding 
preventive and corrective actions. 
A common way of illustrating the rules is to form a security boundary that delineates between 
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acceptable and unacceptable regions of operation. The security boundary is identified via repeated 
contingency simulations to identify operating conditions that just meet the post-contingency 
performance evaluation criteria. These boundaries can be visualized via what are known as nomograms 
that use coordinate axes to represent pre-contingency values of the operational parameters such as 
flows, generation levels, or load levels. Nomograms not only indicate whether operating conditions are 
secure; in addition, they provide a way to gauge the system security level based on subjective 
assessment of operating point proximity to the security boundary. 
In deterministic security assessment, the decision is founded on the requirement that each outage 
event in the contingency set results in system performance that satisfies the chosen performance 
evaluation criteria. 
Application of the deterministic approach consists of the following basic steps: 
Step I: Develop power flow base cases corresponding to the time period (year, season) and loading 
conditions (peak, partial peak, of peak) necessary for the study. In each base case, the unit commitment 
and network topology is selected based on the expected conditions for the chosen time period. The 
topologies selected are normally all circuits in service; here, credibility is emphasized over severity. 
Sometimes sensitivity studies are also performed if weakened topologies are planned. 
Step 2: Select the contingency set. Normally this set consists of credible events for which post-
contingency performance could be significantly affected by the study parameters. In deterministic 
studies, the "N-1" rule, where events are limited to only those involving loss of one component, is often 
used to identify what is credible. 
Step 3: Identify the range of operating conditions, in terms of the study parameters, which are 
expected during the time period of interest. We refer to this as the study range. 
Step 4: Identify the set of operating conditions within the study range where a limiting contingency 
"first" violates the performance evaluation criteria. This set of operating conditions constitutes a line (for 
two study parameters), a surface (for three) or a hyper-surface (for more than three) that partitions the 
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study range. This line, surface, or hyper-surface is the security boundary. 
Step 5: Condense the security boundary into a set of plots or tables that are easily understood and 
used by the operator. As previously indicated, the nomogram is a common way to do this. 
The traditional deterministic method provides a very simple rule for use in making this decision: 
optimize economy with hard constraints of the secure operational region. It is this simplicity that has 
made the deterministic method so attractive, and so useful, in the past. Today, however, with the 
industry's emphasis on economic competition, and with the associated increased network vulnerability, 
there is a growing recognition that this simplicity also carries with it significant subjectivity, and this can 
result in constraints that are not uniform with respect to the security level. This suggests that the ultimate 
decisions that are made may not be the "best" ones. 
In the following section, we are going to introduce a probabilistic security assessment method. In 
section 1.5, decision-making techniques based on the security assessment are described. 
1.4 Risk Based Security Assessment 
In this section, we briefly introduce a developed risk-based method to assess the security of a power 
system. This method is based a probabilistic model described below. 
1.4.1 Probabilistic Model 
The probabilistic model of power systems we use is based on [3] and [4], in which the following 
assumptions are made: 
1. All loads follow normal distribution with known means and covariance matrix. 
(P,Q)'~ Nj(P,Q),L) 
Here P and Q are the means of loads P and Q respectively. 
If we define (M,LiQ)'= (P, Q)- (P, Q), then 
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(1-1) 
2. Linearize the relationship between voltages at PQ buses and loads and the relationship between 
branch flows and loads around the expected values of the loads. 
Let we use (V, T) and (V, T) to denote the voltages at PQ buses, branch flows and their expected 
values respectively. 
We have 
(V,T) = (V,T) + (~V,~T) 
av 
dP 
dT 
dP 
(1-2) 
From (1-1) and (1-2), we obtain the distribution of the voltages and branch flows as follows. 
(V,T) ~ Nn ((V,T)',.I'LJ') 
That is, the voltages and branch flows also follow multivariate normal distribution. 
3. Contingencies follow Poisson distribution. 
Let us use a discrete random variable Event to represent the event that will happen in the next time 
interval. Event=O means that no contingencies will happen in the next time interval. Event=i (i> 1) 
means that the event that will happen is contingency i. The probability that contingency i will occur 
in the next time interval can be calculated by 
Pr(Event = i) = 1- e-A; (1-3) 
Here, Ai is the occurrence rate of contingency i per time interval. Suppose there are n credible 
contingencies. The probability that no contingencies will happen in the next time interval is 
n 
Pr(Event = 0) = 1- Pr(Event > 0) = 1- L (l - e-A;) 
i=I 
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1.4.2 Quantification of Security - Risk 
In the probabilistic model established above, to quantify the impact of conditions and events on 
components, severity functions are defined to quantify the severity of the network conditions in terms of 
performance indicators for different security problems. To obtain simplicity, we focus on low voltage 
and overload problems here. Severity functions for low voltage and overload problems in a power 
system we chosen are given in Figure 1-2 and 1-3. In Figure 1-3, Tis the active power on a branch and 
Rating is the rating of the branch. 
SL V (low voltage severity) 
1.0 
0.95 1.0 V 
Figure 1-2: Severity function for low 
voltage problem 
SOL ( overload severity) 
1.0 --------------
0.9 1.0 T/Rating 
Figure 1-3: Severity function for 
overload problem 
These severity functions provide a valuation of an operator's preferences for these conditions, with 
a low value represents a more preferred condition. After the definition of the severity function, the low 
voltage risk of bus i under contingency j can be calculated as 
+oo 
RiskLV;i = E(SLV(V;)IEvent = j) = f SLV(V;) · f (Vu;Vu ,a;~)dVu 
where Vii is the mean of the voltage at bus i under the condition that event j happens. O';~ is the 
variance of the voltage. In a similar way, the overload risk of branch k under contingency j can be 
calculated as: 
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+oo 
RiskOLkj = E(SLV(Tk )!Event= j) = f SOL(Tk) · f(Tkj ;I\ ,a~ )dTkj 
T ij is the mean of the active power flowing through branch k under the condition that event j happens. 
a~ is the variance of the branch flow. The two kinds of risks calculated above give us useful 
information of the severity of each low voltage and overload problem. Especially, when j=O, RiskL Vio 
and RiskOLkO represent the pre-contingency security level of components. 
To measure the overall risk of a power system, the sum of the risks of all components of the power 
system can be calculated. Here we define two kinds of total risks. 
RiskTo = E(I, SLV (V;) + I, SOL(Tk) Event= 0) 
k 
= I, Risk (V;o) + I, Risk (Tko) (1-3) 
k 
RiskTc = E(I, Severity(V;) + I, Severity(Tk) Event~ 0) 
i k 
= ~[ ~Risk(T;)+ f'Risk(V,)l P(Event = jlEvent ;t, 0) (1-4) 
In the above two formula, the first total risk calculated reflects the current operating condition 
without consideration of contingencies. The second total risk calculated reflects the security level 
considering different contingencies. They reflect two aspects of the whole system, the pre-contingency 
security level and the post-contingency security level. In the following, we call them total pre-
contingency risk and total post-contingency risk respectively. 
In risk based security assessment, pre-contingency component risks, total pre-contingency risk and 
total post-contingency risk can be combined to determine the security level of power system operating 
states. In this work, we define a hard limit for pre-contingency component risks. Whenever this limit is 
violated for some components, corrective actions should be taken to send the components back within 
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-
the limit. This is very important because a component cannot last long at high risk if no actions are 
taken, and the failure of a component will cause a more serious impact on the power system. We also 
define two soft limits for total pre-contingency risk and total post-contingency risk. When any one of 
these two limits is violated, a decision on whether and how to implement actions to enhance the security 
should be made based on the factors of security and economy. 
1.4.3 Comparison of Deterministic and Probabilistic Methods 
We have briefly described the model used for risk based security assessment. As, the model used in 
the probabilistic method here is different from the model used in the traditional deterministic method. 
The probabilistic method captures some influences that are not captured by the deterministic method. 
1. Effect of outage probability 
The deterministic approach does not distinguish between the likelihood of contingencies in the 
contingency set, but different contingencies may have different probabilities, and the probabilistic 
approach accounts for this. Thus, contingencies are considered equally important in deterministic 
method. In risk-based method, there may be some situations where a deterministic violation contributes 
low risk because the outage probability is low. In these cases, the compact of the contingency may be 
large but they are considered less important because of their probabilities. In the same way, some 
contingencies with smaller impact and higher probability need to be considered more. 
2. Severity of violations 
In risk-based method above, a continuous severity functions are used to describe the degree of 
violations. When the total risk of the system is considered, those violations with values far out of the 
limits will be considered more than those violations with values out of the limit just a little. In traditional 
deterministic method, all violations are unacceptable, which means that each violation is treated equally 
without consideration of different severity of the violations. 
3. Effect of uncertainty in operating conditions 
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The deterministic approach cannot address uncertainty in operating conditions. This limitation inhibits 
rigorous analysis of near future operating conditions since the future is inherently uncertain. On the 
hand, probabilistic assessment treats uncertainty in operating conditions very well. As a result, they are 
appropriate for assessing future conditions. 
4. Effect of uncertainty in operating conditions 
The deterministic approach assesses only the most restrictive contingencies and corresponding 
problems; i.e., it does not recognize the influence on security level of less restrictive contingencies or 
problems. On the other hand, risk based method does capture the increased risk caused by multiple 
constraints as it sums risk associated with all contingencies and problems, i.e., the probabilistic 
approach is capable of composing risk from multiple events and multiple problems and it reflects the 
total composite risk and not simply that from the single most restrictive event. 
Due to these differences stated above, we can have the following conclusion. The deterministic 
method is simpler than the risk-based method because a simple model is used. On the other hand, the 
risk-based method can provide more refined information than the traditional deterministic method 
because of the more detailed model used. With more stressed power systems nowadays, the risk based 
method will be helpful for the control center operator to understand more about the security of power 
system and make right decisions. 
1.5 Decision Making on Corrective/Preventive Action 
Traditionally, deterministic methods consider security as some constraints. For example, the well-
known optimal power flow (OPF) considers security using inequality constraints on the network 
performance, e.g., flows and voltage magnitudes. By quantifying security, probabilistic assessment 
facilitates the inclusion of security in economic optimization and decision-making algorithms. In our 
work, the security here is considered both as constraints and objectives in the optimization. For each 
component in the power system, there is a constraint that its pre-contingency risk should be under a 
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well-defined limit. The constraint ensures that the component will work securely. Total pre-contingency 
risk is included as an objective together with the operation costs when decisions on corrective actions 
are made. For preventive actions, two more objective are included to help make decisions, total post-
contingency risk and variance, which reflects the variability of risks of different contingencies. As 
probabilistic assessment gives out a clearer view of the power system security level, we are confident 
that the control center operator can make more consistent and better decisions using the new method. 
A flow chart that shows the decision making process for corrective/preventive actions based on 
probabilistic assessment is given in the figure 1-4. 
Obtain system state 
Some component 
risks too high or total 
pre-contingency risk 
too high 
Yes 
Yes 
Emergency 
State 
Corrective 
action 
Preventive 
action 
Figure 1-4: Flow chart for preventive/corrective action 
1.6 Objective and Organization of this thesis 
With the increased economy competition and network vulnerability, it is desirable that operators 
13 
can make "best" decisions that balance well the factors of economy and security. Though traditionally 
operational decision-making based on deterministic methods is simpler, it may not be able to satisfy 
this requirement, as deterministic methods can result in constraints that are not uniform with respect 
to the security level. To improve the quality of decisions on corrective and preventive actions, we 
employ a more powerful probabilistic method to assess the power system security level here, and 
accordingly, explore a new way to aid the control center operator to make consistent and "best" 
decisions based on the security level information that is derived from the probabilistic method. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 covers different multi-criterion decision making techniques. As the selection of corrective 
and preventive actions is to achieve an optimal compromise between security and economy, the 
problem is essentially a multi-criterion decision making problem. Different multi-criterion decision 
making techniques are covered in Chapter 2, and two methods are chosen to solve the problem. 
In Chapter 3, a heuristic algorithm based on sensitivities is presented to find appropriate corrective 
actions. A simulation is done utilizing a modified version of IEEE 96 RTS system. 
In Chapter 4, multi-criterion decision making techniques and sensitivity method is combined to 
decide the best preventive actions. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this work and provides some suggestions for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 CONTROL ROOM SECURITY 
ECONOMY DECISION MAKING 
2.1 Introduction 
Human beings are decision makers. Sometimes they take a choice among alternative courses of 
actions with little consciousness. While for some major personal or business problems, careful weighing 
of all alternatives and their consequences is required and the complexity of the problems, competitive 
pressures and limited time frame can make the process of decision making difficult and agonizing. It is 
beneficial to decision makers if they can obtain some aid or guidance in the process. In power systems, 
control center operators are concerned with day-to-day operation of the power system. They have to 
ensure that the power system runs economically and securely. To make these decisions, the operators 
need to consider the security level of the power system and whether it is accepted, and if not, the cost 
and effect of enhancing the security level. Different alternatives the operator has to consider include: 
when and how to re-dispatch generation for security purposes, run the system at risk in spite of outage 
and violations, how to initiate load curtailment if system risks cannot be eliminated by other measures. 
Because continuously increasing load is not matched with a commensurate increase in transmission 
capability, operators are facing more frequently the control room security economy decision problems. 
It is desirable if there is a decision support system to provide some suggestions and aid them to in 
making consistent and right decisions. 
In order to improve the quality of decisions, some knowledge of decision theory is necessary. A 
decision problem consists of the following elements: decision maker, candidate alternatives, control 
variables, states of nature, outcome, and decision criteria. Different decision problems have their own 
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contexts and thus their own characteristics. We can classify them into different groups according to 
these characteristics. 
• Based on decision maker, decision problems can be divided into individual decision making and 
group decision making problems. In the former, there is only one decision maker to make the 
decision. In the latter, there are multiple decision makers with different backgrounds and interests 
and reconciliation needs to be made to reach a final decision. 
• Based on the candidate alternatives, decision problems can be treated as descriptive models, in 
which a limited fixed number of alternatives are evaluated to choose a best choice to the decision 
maker, or prescriptive models, in which there are infinite alternatives and the task of the models is 
to indicate good choices for decision makers. 
• Based on states of nature (a set of possible scenarios), a decision is under certainty if the decision 
maker knows which state of nature will occur and what the outcome of each alternative will be, 
under risk if the decision maker can identify each state of nature and the probability of occurrence 
of each state of nature and knows the outcome associated with the each alternative and state of 
nature, and under uncertainty if the decision maker knows the specific outcomes associated with 
each alternative under each state of nature, but he does not know, or is unwilling to express 
quantitatively the probabilities associated with the states. 
• Based on decision criteria, decision problems can be divided two groups: single-criterion if there is 
only one criterion, and multi-criterion if several conflicted criteria are involved. 
In electric power systems, control center operators need to consider the economy and security of 
operation. Economy and security are usually in conflict with each other. Thus the decision problem 
faced by control center operators is essentially a multi-criterion decision making problem. In the context 
of risk based security assessment, contingencies are states of nature. Since we've assumed that the 
probabilities of contingencies are known, the problem is a decision-making problem under risk. 
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2.2 Multi-criterion Decision Making in Power System 
As stated above, the implementation of preventive/corrective action is a multi-criterion decision 
making problem for the control center operator. Thus, we explore the techniques for multi-criterion 
decision making in detail. 
Multi-criterion decision-making problems are more difficult than single-criterion decision-making 
problems in that an optimal tradeoff needs to be reached for several conflicting criteria. Thus, for multi-
criterion decision-making problem, extra efforts need to be spent on establishing the preference 
structure of different criteria for decision maker. The research on multi-criterion decision-making can be 
dated back to the mid 1960' s, when management scientists and researchers carried out a serious study 
on multi-objective problems. Since then, many new theories and methods have been developed in this 
area. While research into techniques for multi-criteria optimization has provided the potential user with 
a wide range of tools, this multitude of possible approaches also presents him with the difficult task of 
choosing a method, or a set of methods, to apply to the specific problem to be solved. 
There are two major areas that address decision making with several criteria, multi-objective 
decision making (MODM) and multi-attribute decision making (MADM). The former concentrates on 
continuous decision spaces with infinite alternatives, and the decision problem is basically formulated 
as a mathematical programming problem with several objective functions. The latter focuses on 
problems with discrete decision spaces with only finite fixed alternatives. 
The general multi-attribute decision-making model can be formulated as follows. 
Let X= {xdi=l, ... , n} be a (finite) set of decision alternatives and G={gilj=l, ... , m} a (finite) set of 
goals according to which the desirability of an action is judged. The task for the model is to determine 
the optimal alternative x0 with the highest degree of desirability with respect to all relevant goals gj. 
This kind of decision-making problem is not so complex because of the limited number of 
alternatives. There are lots of ranking methods to find the user-preferred solution. 
In power systems, when the control center is provided with several options of P/C actions to 
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choose, the problem is a multi-attribute decision making problem. In this work, we are not going to limit 
our work to only evaluate some given alternatives. Instead, one of the important parts of this work is to 
utilize a prescriptive model in which there are infinite alternatives and indicate a set of potentially "best" 
choices to the operator from those alternatives. In multi-criterion decision making, this part belongs to 
the area of multi-objective decision making. 
In mathematical programming, a MODM-problem is basically a vector optimization problem which 
can be defined as follows: 
Maximize { f(x)lxE X} 
where f(x)=(f1(x), ... , fk(x)) is a vector-valued function of XE Rn into R\ flx) represents the desirability 
of the ith criterion and X is the decision space. 
Sometimes we can find such ax* that satisfies flx*)~flx) for all iE { 1,2, ... k} and all XE X. Then the 
corresponding alternative is the best one. But that is a very rare case. Under most conditions, we cannot 
find an alternative that can excel others in every criterion. So a so-called optimal compromise solution is 
chosen instead. An optimal compromise solution of a vector-maximum problem is a solution xk which is 
preferred by the decision maker to all solutions, taking into consideration all criteria in the vector valued 
objective function. It is generally accepted that an optimal compromise solution has to be an efficient 
solution. 
An efficient solution is defined as follows: 
In the vector optimization problem defined above, x * is an efficient solution if and only if there is 
no other xEX such that zlx) ~zlx*) for i=l, ... ,k and zlx)>zlx*) for at least one i=l, ... , K. The set of 
all efficient solutions is generally called the complete solution. 
Multi-objective decision making and vector optimization are very closely related concepts. There is 
a small difference between them. A vector optimization problem has multiple solutions (efficient 
solutions); a multi-objective decision making problem has only one solution (the optimal comprise 
solution) that belongs to the solutions of the corresponding vector optimization problem. 
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Generally, there are two stages to get the optimal compromise solution: the determination of 
efficient solutions and the determination of an optimal compromise solution. 
Two methods are commonly used to determine the efficient solutions [10]. 
1. The weighting method 
We assume a set of nonnegative, not all zero numbers, w1,w2, ••• , Wn is given, which are considered 
to be the relative importance of the objectives. The multi-objective programming problem is reduced to 
the single objective problem 
II 
Maximize I, wizi(x) 
i=I 
Subject to xE X 
For a relatively simple problem, one may solve analytically for the set of efficient non-inferior 
solutions x* and the required set of weights by applying the set of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The drawback of analytical approach is it is only practical for a rather limited number of problems. Very 
often, a numerical solution procedure is required to solve the weighting problem for a given w. When 
the objective functions and the constraint set have no properties, it seems natural to proceed in an ad hoc 
manner. We can consider each weight wi between O and 1 as having a reasonable number of discrete 
values. Then we solve the single objective problem numerically for each combination of values of w1, 
w2, ••• , wn. It is clearly not practical to generate the entire set of efficient solutions in the manner. The 
most one can hope for is a representative subset that is reasonably good. A final choice can be selected 
from this subset. This not only makes sense, but it is also practical. It may be inhibiting, if not 
overwhelming, for the decision maker to have to select the best alternative from the entire set of 
efficient solutions, if there is no systematic search procedure to help him. 
2. The £-constraint method 
Assume that the objective f1 has the greatest preference and for k:t:l, there are given numbers Ek, 
which are considered lower bounds for the objective f k such that the decision maker does not accept any 
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solution with lower value than E\ in at least one of the objectives fk. Then the multi-objective 
programming problem can be reduced to the single objective minimization problem having the form 
Maximize z1(k) 
Subject to XE X 
zk(x)~ Ek (k;t=l) 
There are three principal variations of the £-constraint method: the inequality constraint approach, 
the equality constraint approach, and the hybrid (weighting-constraint) approach. The hybrid approach 
is very efficient when we are merely interested in generating efficient solutions numerically. The£-
constraint method is best suited to integration of interactive multi-objective decision-makjng, because it 
not only generates efficient solutions but also furnishes trade-off information at each efficient solution 
generated. 
In power system operation, let's consider the implementation of preventive action. If we define the 
operation cost function of preventive action as C(x), the total pre-contingency risk without as Rn(x), 
and the total post-contingency risk as R2T(x), the pre-contingency risk of component k as R1k(x), the 
variance of impact under the condition that one contingency happens is V ar(x), then the generation of 
efficient alternatives of preventive action in power system can be formulated as a vector optimization 
problem as below. 
Minimize (C(x), Rn(x), R2T(x), Var(x)) 
XE X where X is determined by the two constraints below. 
Because of the complexity of functions C(x), R1T(x), R2T(x), it is not possible to get all the efficient 
solutions through an analytical method. Therefore a numerical method can be used here. We can choose 
some representative sets of weights and then use the ad hoc weighting method to find a representative 
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subset of efficient solutions. 
Though very simple and easy to understand, the weighting method has a limitation. If all wi are 
strictly positive, the subset we get are efficient solutions. But not all efficient solutions can be generated 
through this method, that is, some efficient solutions of the "vector maximum" problem are not 
solutions to the weighting problem no matter what values of the set of weights are chosen. In the 
following example, it is shown why some efficient solutions cannot be generated through this method 
under certain condition. 
To simplify the problem, let's suppose that we only want to minimize the operation costs C(x) and 
the total risk under the condition that one contingency will happen R2T(x). His the space of vector 
(C(x), R2T(x)) and the corresponding area is shown in the following figure. 
A 
C(x) 
Figure 2-1. Weighting methods for a multi-objective decision problem 
with concave space of objectives 
In the above figure, the complete set of efficient solutions are those x corresponding to (C(x), 
R2T(x)) on the curve of A-D-C-E-B. But only those efficient solutions on the curve of A-Dor the curve 
of E-B can be generated through the weighting method. The efficient solutions on the curve D-C-E 
cannot be generated. This is because for any w1 and w2, there exists a point in A-Dor E-B with a value 
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of w1C(x)+w2R2T(x) less than any point on the curve of D-C-E. It is pointed out that when the space of 
objectives is convex, then all the efficient solutions can be generated by the weighting method using 
appropriate w. In the figure below, His convex, and all the efficient solutions is on the curve of A-C-B, 
and they can be generated by weighting method by choosing different weights goals. 
C(x) 
Figure 2-1. Weighting methods for a multi-objective decision problem 
with convex space of objectives 
After a representative set of efficient solutions are calculated, the control center operator needs to 
find the most preferred alternatives from them. Thus the problem is becoming a multi-attribute decision 
making problem. Various methods can be used to single out the optimal compromise solution. In the 
following section, some commonly used methods are introduced and compared. 
2.3 Introduction of Different MCDM Methods 
There are so many discussions about the advantage and disadvantages of different MCDM methods 
that it is hard to say a decision making method is better than others. The decision of using a decision-
making method itself becomes a decision making problem. Here are some commonly used methods. 
• Value or Utility-based Approaches 
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A value function usually describes a person's preference regarding different levels of an attribute 
under certainty. Utility functions (a specific type of value function) also represent attitude of risk. This 
method changes all of the objectives to a corresponding value (utility) reflecting the DM' s preference to 
the objective. The value (utility) is additive. By adding the values or utilities of all objectives, an index 
for a certain action can be obtained. This index can be used for making the decision. Additive function 
is unquestionably the amalgamation method in widest use, for two very good reasons: its simplicity, and 
the fact that its result tends to be robust with respect to mild non-linearity. Some people are against this 
method. Because they think that considering a single objective function (profit, cost, utility, etc.), as in 
the classical mathematical optimization, presuppose that the decision maker's preference and values are 
both complete and definite at the beginning of the decision maker's involvement. The decision was 
implicitly made; it only remains to be explicated through mathematical search or algorithms. The 
decision maker can then only say yes or no to the final outcome. The solution to mathematical 
optimization is usually unique and no further decision making effort is required. These people support 
the interactive techniques that will be mentioned later. Some people think the value or utility-based 
methods are more interactive than it thought to be. After DM learns more about the problem in the 
process of using the method, they can learns more about the problem and themselves and then change 
the utility function to reflect more of his preference. Thus more reasonable and consistent decision can 
be made by the decision maker. 
• ELECTRE IV 
It is the latest version of a series of ELECTRE outranking method. Decision maker should indicate 
what his thresholds of different criteria are with respect to indifference and preference. The basic idea of 
ranking alternatives is to compare the numbers of alternatives that they strongly outranked and weakly 
outranked respectively. This method ranks the options without introducing any criterion importance 
weightings. The model avoids weights by assuming that no preference structure should be based on the 
greater or less importance of the criteria. No single criterion dominates the decision making process. But 
J 
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some people [47] are against this method saying that it introduces "further ad hoc functional forms, 
which although intuitively appealing, are difficult to verify empirically as models of human 
preferences." 
• Evidential Theory 
This method offers an efficient way to represent uncertainty and to perform reasoning under 
uncertainty. For MCDM, each criterion can be regarded as a piece of evidence. Using Dempster's Rule 
of combination, we can obtain aggregated information from that of different evidences. The final 
decision is made based on the combined information. 
• Promethee 
This method is quite similar to the ELECTRE III method, except that it does not use a discordance 
index. It also takes advantage of the most recent developments of preference modeling at that time. 
• Goal programming 
The DM specifies a goal or a target value for each one of the criteria and tries to find the alternative 
that is closest to those targets according to a measure of distance in the form of 
{ / }I/ P [ W; IG; - V; ( A ll]P . Goal programming in its most general form uses both cardinal and ordinal 
preference information. The cardinal information required consists of target values for the attributes 
involved together with a set of weighting factors indicating the degree of importance the decision maker 
attaches to the attainment of these goals. The ordinal information takes the form of a ranking of the 
attributes by assigning them to several priority classes. In [9], the method is assessed as "a popular 
amalgamation method that yields a ranking of alternatives." In a literature review by White D.J.[46], 
280 applications of the approach are cited .. Unfortunately, this method has a serious drawback that if the 
target levels are not appropriately set, the solution may not be an efficient solution. 
• Lexicographic Method 
This method involves a process of ranking objectives according to the most important criterion. The 
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top subset is identified according to the first most important criterion, and the alternatives in this subset 
are ranked according to the second most important criterion, and so on, until a single alternative is left 
or all criteria have been examined. 
• Interactive approach 
Information concerning preference can be elicited from the decision maker either non-interactively 
or interactively. Non-interactive techniques require that preference be elicited only once, either before 
or after analyzing the system. All the multi-criteria methods mentioned above are non-interactive 
method. On the other hand, an interactive approach requires active progressive interaction between the 
decision maker and the analyst throughout the solution process. An interactive approach is normally 
characterized by three basic steps: 
Step I: Solve the problem based on some initial set of parameters to obtain a feasible, preferably 
non-inferior solution. 
Step 2: Get the decision maker to react to this solution. 
Step 3: Use the decision maker's response to formulate a new set of parameters, form a new 
problem to be solved. 
Steps ( I - 3) are repeated until the decision maker is satisfied with the current solution or no further 
action can be taken by the method. 
The STEP method [45], the Geoffrin-Dyer-Feinberg method [43], and the Zionts-Wallenius method 
[ 44] belong to this kind of method. In interactive methods, there exists specification of feedback 
processes, which brings flexibility and adaptability to the real situation. Interactive methods are search-
oriented and learning-oriented. Some people [ 42] prefer interactive methods to the utility-based methods 
as interactive methods involves the decision making throughout the process in a way that the utility-
based method does not. 
One of the major differences between different decision making methods is they use different 
preference structures. The Lexicographic method assumes the decision maker has an order of 
.I 
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importance of the criteria, in this method, a disadvantage on one criterion cannot be counterbalanced by 
an advantage on another, i.e., it is a non-compensatory method. In ELECTRE-IV method, two different 
degrees of preference are defined, and the numbers of two kinds of outranking are considered to 
compare different alternatives. One of the advantages of this method is that it has a concept of 
incomparable alternatives. AHP, value and utility based approach, goal programming consider the 
relative importance of different criteria, which is essential information for characterizing the DM' s 
preference. The ELECTRE series, the Promethee method, and the evidential theory can only applied to 
decision cases with finite alternatives, while value or utility based approach and goal programming can 
be applied to cases with infinite alternatives, i.e., continuous problems. In utility-based approaches, the 
attitude of the DM towards risk is considered. If the attitude of the DM is risk-neutral, then this method 
can be looked upon as a weighting method. Evidential theory can combine different DM' s decision and 
can separate that which is unknown from that which is uncertain. Its method of handling different 
criteria is using Dempster' s Rule. 
Another difference between these methods is the technique used. MCDM methods are divided into 
holistic, heuristic and wholistic techniques [3]. Holistic methods evaluate the alternatives independently 
to choose the highest-rated one, and thus differ from each other in terms of the scoring functions used. 
AHP, value or utility-based methods, and goal programming belong to this kind of technique. The 
heuristic method is a process of sequential comparison of alternatives to determine the preferred choice. 
Methods include ELECTRE and other outranking methods, in which the most satisfying alternative is 
obtained by pair-wise preference ordering of a finite set of alternatives. Wholistic judgment is based on 
previous experience and includes intuition, standard operating procedures, and reasoning by analogy. 
The model used is a naturalistic decision model. Up to now, very few wholistic methods have been 
developed. The methods mentioned above all belong to holistic and heuristic methods. 
In Table 2-1 at page 28, different methods and their characteristics are summarized for purpose of 
easy compansons. 
Table 2.1 Some MCDM Methods and Their Characteristics 
Weighting Value or 
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2.4 Choosing Appropriate Method 
The primary function of a decision analysis is to help the decision maker understood his situation, 
his preferences and his beliefs better so that through this understanding he may make a more informed 
decision. In an insightful statement, Simon French said in [ 12], that the purpose of all the multi-criterion 
decision-making problems is to "erect such a model decision maker that is idealized and a reflection of 
attitudes of real decision maker. He is idealized and in that his logical structure is always consistent 
with certain axioms, which embody principles which I believe to be canons of rational behavior. Thus 
he is idealized in a way that the real decision maker will admire, and the consistency embodied in his 
behavior is one that I would like to emulate." 
The use of different MCDM methods can lead to very different decisions. Thus we may wonder 
which method to use. Different types of problems generally require different approaches. The 
limitations on available information may affect the choice of method. And the degree to which a person 
is familiar with the method is another factor to consider which affect the effectiveness of a method. Due 
to these reasons, there is no MCDM accepted universally as the best and most appropriate for all 
problems. The choice of an appropriate problem structure and use of an appropriate method are 
important in obtaining a satisfactory decision. Also, since different methods have different preference 
models, only when DMs understand the problem and themselves clearly, can they choose appropriate 
decision making methods. 
It is very helpful for a DM to apply different MCDM methods to a problem. Surely different 
alternatives will be chosen since people have difficulty quantifying their preference precisely. In 
different methods, different question phrasing and context will make their articulation easy to change. 
In the process of examining and resolving the conflicts, the DM will have more insight into the problem 
and his preferences. He can then choose a method that is appropriate and make his decisions with more 
confidence. 
In this work, we are not going to make decisions for the control center operator. Instead, we think 
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the suggestion of different options and the information related is important. It is the task of the operator 
to decide what option to take based on the information provided. From this viewpoint, we think it will 
be very beneficial that a toolbox containing implementation of different multi-criterion decision making 
problems is provided. The toolbox analyzes different alternatives that are efficient solutions calculated 
and provide the rankings of the alternatives for different methods. By careful study of the different 
results of different methods, the operator can identify what causes the differences and know more about 
the alternatives and what his preference structure is. This process can ensure that a more consistent and 
reasonable decision is made by the operator. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, to make a good decision on power system operations, we introduced some decision 
theories. The decision problem of power system operations is treated as a multi-criterion decision 
problem under risk. As we think that providing suggestions and advice is more important and helpful 
than making decisions for the control center operator, the decision problem is handled in two stages. In 
the first stage, we treat the problem as a vector optimization problem, using ad hoc weighting methods 
to find a set of efficient solutions. These solutions are potentially good alternatives to be further 
investigated. In the second stage, given the alternatives, we employ different MCDM methods to study 
the alternatives, giving out ranking information corresponding to different methods. The operator can 
then choose his preferred option based on the information given. 
:I 
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CHAPTER 3 CORRECTIVE ACTION SELECTION 
3.1 Introduction 
When a power system is in emergency state, i.e., some operational limits are being violated and the 
power system security is threatened, some operations are necessary to be done to eliminate the 
violations and enhance the security. These operations are called corrective actions or remedial actions. 
Different corrective actions are needed to eliminate or relieve different kinds of security problems. A 
comprehensive view of various security problems and the corresponding possible corrective actions is 
given out in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1. Security problem types and corresponding possible actions 
Security problem type Possible actions 
Overload Re-dispatch, network switching, trip overloaded lines, curtail transfers, direct load trip, change phase shifter angle. 
Low voltage Network switching, change tap position of transformers, various VAR compensation, raise unit voltage, shed load. 
Voltage instability Insert capacitors, re-dispatch, commit a unit, curtail transfers, direct load trip. 
Transient instability Arm or initiate partial unit scheme, raise unit voltage, re-dispatch. 
Oscillations Arm or initiate islanding scheme, curtail transfers. 
Under frequency Ramp generation, shed load. 
Lots of research has been done on how to find appropriate corrective actions. These efforts can be 
grouped into two categories: optimal power flow (OPF) and expert systems. 
OPF was introduced by Carpentier in 1962. It is now widely applied in power systems. When the 
power system is in the emergency state, OPF can provide a solution of how to relieve overload or 
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voltage violations. But OPF has some deficiencies, which are discussed in [2] and [ 48]. OPF utilize all 
available control actions to obtain an optimal solution, but it is not practical to operate more than a 
limited number of controls in many applications. For example, the rescheduling of large number of 
reactive controls is unmanageable in real time for a reactive power dispatch problem. Thus it is 
desirable that we can select the best set of actions with a limited size. But we cannot select the best and 
most effective set of controls from the existing OPF solutions. The discreteness of OPF is another 
problem as discrete controls are widely used by the industry. OPF is essentially a mixed discrete-
continuous optimization problem in which a rigorous solution is very time consuming to arrive. Some 
approximation approaches are used to handle the discreteness. The discreteness of the OPF affects the 
computational efficiency and the goodness of the solutions. 
Expert system applications in corrective action can be dated back to 1986, when Liu and Tomsovic 
[ 13] developed an expert system that used empirical rules to generate control actions to alleviate voltage 
violations. Later, in an expert system developed by Kawakami and Tamura [ 14] to eliminate voltage 
violations, minimizing the number of control operations and maintaining adequate security margin are 
considered. There were other expert systems for voltage violations [ 15-18, 29]. For overload problems, 
Heydaman, Noteboom and Paap[ 19] developed an expert system that provides suggestions such as 
switching parallel lines, rescheduling generation and adjusting voltages. Paillet and Budbost [20] utilize 
network reconfiguration to eliminate line violations. Some other expert systems to eliminate overloads 
can be seen in [21-23]. 
Noticing the deficiencies stated above, some OPFs are using heuristic rules to deal with the 
problems of control discreteness and selection of a suitable subset of controls [30,31]. On the other 
hand, expert systems should use more or less numerical algorithms to be more efficient. Good heuristic 
rules and good numerical algorithms are both important for the real time implementation of corrective 
actions. In [33], a hybrid system that uses both heuristic rules and numerical methods is developed to 
find a practical number of controls to improve voltage profile. In our work here, we adopted this 
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approach to find appropriate corrective actions. 
3.2 Formulation of the problem 
As stated before, the objective of corrective actions is to send a power system from an emergency 
state to an alert or normal state. In other words, corrective actions are necessary when the security of 
some components or the system under current condition (without consideration of contingencies) is 
threatened. In traditional deterministic method, this is reflected by violations of operational limits of 
components in deterministic values, such as flows and voltage magnitudes. 
In risk-based approach, we have already defined some types of risks that reflect different security 
problems, such as pre-contingency component risks, component risks under certain contingency, total 
pre-contingency risk, and total post-contingency risk. A natural question arises that what kind of risks 
need to be considered in this new approach as far as corrective actions are concerned. Among all the 
risks above, pre-contingency component risks and total pre-contingency risk are good indices that 
reflect the current security level (without consideration of contingencies) from the perspective of 
components and the whole system. Therefore, we will utilize them in our implementation of corrective 
action. For other types of risks, as they reflect the impact of contingencies, they will be considered in 
preventive actions, which is dealt with in the next chapter. 
Economy is another import factor that we need to consider in selecting a "best" corrective action. It 
is always desirable to us that a given corrective action that can enhance the security level of the power 
system is also not expensive. 
Here, we define the problem of searching for appropriate corrective action as follows. 
Minimize aRiskTo + bCost 
s.t. 
Riskio :::; LR for all i. 
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where a, b are positive parameters, Riskrn is the total pre-contingency risk, Cost is the operation cost, 
RiskiO is the pre-contingency risk of component i, and LR is a predefined constant which is the limit of 
component risks. 
To ensure that the corrective actions we find is manageable, we would prefer a good solution that 
change a set of controls of limited size to an optimal solution that change too many controls. To find 
such a good solution, we select a set of efficient controls of limited size, and then use these control 
variables to eliminate violations of voltages and branch flows as well as minimizes the objective 
function. The risk sensitivity and operating reserve are two important factors that determine how 
effective a control is. In our work, we utilize some heuristic rules to select the efficient controls based 
on the information of sensitivities and operating margin of controls. Then the above optimization 
problem is solved using linear programming. In linear programming, the objective functions and 
constraints are approximated by linear functions, of which the coefficients are calculated through risk 
sensitivities. The solution we get could still have violations because of the approximation. We need to 
update the system states, calculate the risk sensitivities and solve the problem again. The approach we 
take is summarized in figure 3.3. In the following section, we will deal with the calculation of risk 
sensitivities, as the risk sensitivities provide the basis for selection of effective controls and utilized in 
computation of coefficients in linear programming. 
3.3 Risk Sensitivities 
Sensitivities are important in selection of controls such that many methods developed previously 
have employed sensitivity information in selecting controls. However, this previous effort has utilized 
sensitivity of performance to control variables. In this chapter, we propose use of risk sensitivities with 
respect to controls rather than performance sensitivities. By selecting those controls with high 
sensitivities, the amount of change of control can be reduced. In the following, we introduce the 
calculation of risks first, then derive the corresponding sensitivities of low voltage and overload risks 
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with respect to controls. 
3.3.1 Calculation of Risks 
To maintain simplicity so as to focus on concepts, only two kinds of risks are considered: low 
voltage risk and overload risk. The calculations of these risks are as follows. 
Low voltage risk 
First, we have to introduce some random variables that are related to the risk calculation. 
E: event that can happen in the next time internal. Here we suppose n "N-1" contingencies are 
considered. This is a discrete random variable, with a probability mass function as follows. 
When E=O, no contingency will happen; when E=i>O, contingency i will happen. Pi (i>O) can be 
calculated through the equation (1-3). 
Vi: voltage of the bus i 
If we use Vij to donate Vil(E=j), then according to the result of [24], it follows normal distribution, 
we have 
Here, V ij and O";~ are the mean and variance of Vi under the contingency j respectively. 
SL Vi: severity of the bus i, which represents the impact caused by the voltage Vi. 
SL VT: sum of the severities of all buses. SL VT represents the total impact of the power system 
caused by the low voltages. 
According to the definitions above, the low voltage risk of bus i under the event j is 
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- 1 ( (V. . - Vu ) 
2 J where f(Vij, Vu ,aJ) = ..[iii exp - 11 2 is the pdf ofVij, 2TCO"ij 2aij 
SL V/Vij) can be various kinds of functions. Here we define SL Vi as a linear function for 
simplification, which is 
We believe this function properly represents the relative security of the corresponding condition as 
perceived by the operator. 
The severity function is shown in the following figure. 
SLV 
1.0 Pdf ofV.. IJ 
0 0.9 1.0 
Figure 3-1 Severity function for low voltages 
r1 1 ( (Vi' -Vu)
2
) \-1 Then we have RiskLVij = Jo ..[iii exp - !J 2 aVu +bµVu 
2nau 2au 
We can write a program or use the integration function in Matlab to calculate the risk. A more 
convenient and faster way is to compute it is using some derived formula. 
We notice the below simplification: 
2 f l ( (x - µ)2 } ) r(x,µ,a ) = exp - 2 ax+b dx -v2na 2a 
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a a ( ( x - µ )2 J b + aµ 2 {-µ , 
.Jzi 20" 2 ..Ji 0 
----exp----+--- ---_ aa ( (x-µ)
2 J b+aµErf(x-µJ 
.Jzi 20"2 2 (3-1) 
Thus, we may simplify RiskL Vij to: 
(3-2) 
The total low voltage risk under event j is the expected total severity under the event j, i.e., 
Overload risk 
Let's define the branch flow on the branch k and the rating of the branch as Pk (in pu) and Rk 
respectively. 
The branch flow follows normal distribution, we have: Pki = Pk l(E = j) ~ N (P ki, a~) 
severity of branch k is also defined as a linear function, which has the following form. 
, {cP~ +d if Pk~> 0.9 
SOLk (P.k .) = ' 
:J Q if D_<Q9 l rlq _ •. 
Again, we believe the function properly represents the security of the corresponding condition as 
perceived by the operator. The severity function for overloaded branches is shown in Figure 3-2. 
Since the standard deviation of Pkj is far less than P kj , we have 
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The overload risk of branch k under the event j can be calculated as 
From (3-1 ), we have 
The total overload risk under event j is the expected impact of overload under event j, which can be 
calculated as RiskO¼ = L,RiskOL1q. 
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Figure 3-2 Severity function for overloads 
By combining the low voltage risk and overload risk together, we can get a comprehensive index, 
which is RiskTj = RiskLVTj + RiskO¼. This index can reflect total effect of the jth contingency on 
the system. 
As the topic of this chapter is about corrective action, we are concerned with the pre-contingency 
operating condition. Thus, RiskL Vio, RiskOLiO, and RiskTO are of particular interest in this chapter. The 
former two indicate the condition of components while the last gives us information about how well the 
whole system works. 
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3.3.2 Calculation of Risk Sensitivities 
Risk sensitivity to a control is the partial derivative of the risk with respect to the control variable. 
Based on calculus, for the low voltage risk of bus i under contingency j , the sensitivity to control x can 
be calculated as follows . 
aRiskLVij 
ax 
aRiskLV.. -:'IV ·· aRiskLV.. aa .. 1J O I) I] I] - ·--+----·--
avij ax aaij ax 
(3-4) 
a ij is determined by the voltage sensitivities with respect to the reactive and active loads. The 
aaij 
change of a ij is small for certain range of change of control. Thus is very small. Also, 
ax 
aRiskLVij aRiskLV. . 
calculations show that ---- is small compared to - '· 1 when a linear severity function is 
aaij avij 
adopted. From the facts above, we can ignore the second part and simplify the expression of low voltage 
risk sensitivity as 
aRiskLVij aRiskLVij av ij ----=----ax av ij ax (3-5) 
avij . 
We can get -- through power flow equations. Also, we have 
ax 
11 1 ( (½j - v ij) 
2 
) x-= -J2i exp - aV.. +b Vii -V.. V. . 
Q 2 3 22 I] I) I] J'C(Jij (Jij 
There are two ways to calculate the above expression. One way is numerically using the integration 
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function provided by Matlab. Another way is to find an integral function and use the integral function to 
obtain a closed form expression. The second way is much faster than the first way. 
From knowledge of calculus, we can derive the following. 
J 1 · ( (x- µ)
2
) ) s(x;µ,a)= ,J27i exp - 2 aµ+bXx-µ 2na 3 2a 
1 ( ( (x ) 
2 J 2 x-µ ] = -2(ax+b)exp - - + aa.fiii r= J,fz"'exp(-t 2 }it 
2 21rC1 2a "'1r 0 
- ----exp ---- +- --_ ax+b ( (x-µ)
2 J a Erf(x-µ J 
./2iiCY 2a 2 2 
(3-6) 
From (3-6), we can get 
(3-7) 
Thus, the low voltage risk sensitivities can be calculated using (3-5), (3-6) and (3-7). 
Overload risk sensitivity of branch k with respect to control variable x can be calculated in a similar 
way. We have 
dRiskOLk,j _ dRiskOLk,j dPkj 
dx dPkj dx 
(3-8) 
dPk· (- ) s dPk· Also we have: __ :J = sign P kj · _!!E!!._ · __ :J 
dx Rk dx 
(3-9) 
In (3-9), d ~xkj b 1 1 d h h h fl . 0 h h h d 
0 
can e ca cu ate t roug t e power ow equations. n t e ot er an , we can 
derive that 
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(3-10) 
From equations (3-8), (3-9) and (3-10), overload risk sensitivities can be calculated. 
All the above discussion is based on the two linear severity functions for low voltage and overload. 
If the severity functions are more complicated, we can treat them as piecewise linear functions and then 
all the discussion above will still be valid after little modification, or we can derive the sensitivities in a 
similar way based on calculus. 
To validate the method, we can calculate the component risks based on the current condition, then 
change a control variable x by a small amount Llx and calculate the component risks again. If the 
Misk 
method is valid, then risk sensitivities calculated should be approximately equal to --- , where 
Llx 
Misk is difference of component risks calculated after and before the change of control variable x. 
A modified version of IEEE Reliability Test System is used. In the following two tables, dRisk 
dx 
Misk 
and --- of some components under different contingencies are shown. 
Llx 
From these tables, we can see that they are very close to each other. This fact verifies the validity of 
the method of calculating the risk sensitivities. The description of the contingencies is in section 4.5. 
The contingency set considered here was limited to N-1 contingencies. This set includes three line 
outages: 
• Outage ofline A21, which is from bus 12 to bus 23, with an outage rate of l.142x 10-5 per hour. 
• Outage ofline A22, which is from bus 13 to bus 23, with an outage rate of 5.594x 10-5 per hour. 
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• Outage of line A20, which is from bus 12 to bus 13, with an outage rate of 4.242X 10-5 per hour. 
Table 3-1. Low voltage risk sensitivities 
Control dRiskLVij MiskLV. . 
Component i Eventj I] ( Llx =0.001) variable x ax Llx 
P1 -0.06187778 -0.06185628 
Bus3 0 Q3 -1.22205461 -1.22196420 
V1 -5.79340364 -5.86273905 
P1 -0.00249454 -0.00247455 
Bus4 0 Q3 -0.17484308 -0.17482970 
V1 -1.29921665 -1.34289675 
P1 0.00368910 0.00369811 
Bus 8 1 Q3 -0.09285698 -0.09284346 
V1 -1.60223630 -1.59159631 
P1 -0.00143155 -0.00141160 
Bus9 1 Q3 -0.33157383 -0.33153006 
V1 -2.52530008 -2.49856201 
P1 0.05136446 0.05138113 
Bus 11 2 Q3 -0.12974857 -0.12973850 
V1 -1.98923679 -1.98987095 
P1 0.16411032 0.16414393 
Bus 12 2 Q3 -0.11901812 -0.11901027 
V1 -1.85747904 -1.85982954 
P1 -0.13904303 -0.13902315 
Bus24 3 Q3 -0.47344956 -0.47341244 
V1 -2.31793752 -2.40034672 
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Table 3-2. Overload risk sensitivities 
Control cJRiskOLij M.iskOL.. Branch ID Eventj variable x I) ( Ax =0.001) dX Ax 
P1 -0.33729910 -0.33728978 
A23 0 Q3 -0.15964772 -0.15963088 
V1 -0.64147788 -0.67354774 
P1 0.55948884 0.55948110 
A22 1 Q3 -0.09785641 -0.09785187 
V1 -0.79576391 -0.80763391 
P1 -0.35465860 -0.35464603 
A23 1 Q3 -0.21315465 -0.21311462 
V1 -0.74787595 -0.72457201 
P1 1.86901120 1.86896393 
A20 2 Q3 0.10385896 0.10382757 
V1 0.00619151 -0.02240469 
P1 0.29768308 0.29767407 
A21 2 Q3 -0.09310902 -0.09310548 
V1 -0.47205001 -0.47652816 
P1 -0.13370532 -0.13369700 
A23 2 Q3 -0.22842544 -0.22840524 
V1 -1.04632097 -1.04415451 
P1 1.98488358 1.98494886 
A22 3 Q3 0.05864056 0.05861162 
V1 -0.12869094 -0.04365273 
P1 -0.75376542 -0.75379332 
A23 3 Q3 -0.18829768 -0.18827230 
V1 -0.81745109 -0.91068762 
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3.4 Hybrid Method to Find Corrective Action 
Correction actions can be evaluated through the number of controls operated, amounts of change of 
controls, operation costs and the condition after the action. Here, we are going to utilize some rules and 
numerical calculations together with consideration of these aspects. 
The hybrid method we used can be summarized in figure 3.3. In the following part, we will explain 
each step in more details. 
The algorithm is described below: 
Step 1: Calculate the low voltage risks and overload risks, and pick out those components with risk 
near or out of limit. As is natural that we will have more concern on those components with high risks 
than those components with low risks. 
Step 2: Calculate the risk sensitivities to control variables. This step is very important, as it is the 
basis of the selection of controls. Also, the sensitivities are needed for the calculation of coefficients in 
step 4. Here we use Sij to represent risk sensitivity of component i to control variable j. If the effective 
controls are already selected, go to step 4. Otherwise, go to step 3. 
Step 3: Selection of effective control variables. 
It's desirable that the corrective action is simple with limited number of controls. To achieve this 
goal, selection of effective controls are critical. For a large power system with many risk violations, we 
prefer those controls that are efficient in reducing risks of a group of components instead of just the risk 
I 
of one particular component. To tackle this problem, a good way of control selection based on cluster 
analysis is proposed in [ 49] in detail. The method classifies the components with risk violations into 
different groups based on some similarity measurement and then chooses effective controls for each 
group. This method is very efficient to find good controls for a large power system with many 
component risk violations. For the RTS system used here, as the size of the system is small and only a 
few violations exist, the use of the above selection method cannot demonstrate its advantage much. For 
simplicity, we use a selection method as follows. 
Update system 
states 
Use linear programming 
method to determine the 
operation of controls 
N 
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System State 
Risk based security 
assessment 
Pick out those 
component risks near 
or out of limit 
Calculate sensitivities of 
risks with respect to 
controls 
Select the effective controls 
based on the sensitivities and 
operating margins of controls 
No further 
corrective action 
is needed 
Figure 3.3 Implementation of corrective action by risk based approach 
We pick out the components with risks out of limit and select effective control variables for each of 
them. The union of the effective control variables will be used in the next step to decide on the 
operations in detail. For a given component with risk violated, the way to select effective controls for it 
is as follows. 
To minimize the amount of operation needed, it's desirable to select those control variables that 
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have high sensitivities. But some control variable may have a very high sensitivity and a small margin. 
Selection of these control variables may increase the number of controls required, which is not preferred 
in real practice. Based on the consideration, we select those control variables that can reduce the risk 
most. 
We can decide whether to increase or decrease a control variable by the sign of the risk sensitivity. 
If the risk sensitivity to a control variable is negative, we should increase the control variable to reduce 
the risk. If the risk sensitivity is positive, then the control variable should be decreased. Then, according 
to the upper or lower bounds of controls, the amount of risk that they may reduce can be calculated 
roughly based on linear approximation. 
For a control variable x with an upper of bound x and a lower bound of _!, if the risk sensitivity is 
negative, then the risk this control variable can reduce is approximately s x (x - x), if the risk sensitivity 
is positive, then the risk can be reduce through the control by s x ( x - _!) . 
Step 4. Determine the amount to change for each control variable. 
After the effective controls are chosen, we need to determine how to operate these controls to 
eliminate the violations. In the mean time, it is desirable that the control actions are economic and the 
operation condition of the whole system is good. We can formulate the problem in the following way. 
Let's define the cost efficient of control j as wj, Then the total costs of the corrective control are 
w .Llx . . Riskrnis a good index to represent the security level of the whole system. We have £..i J J 
j>O 
Here x0 is a vector of the current values of controls. 
. . . dRiskro 
Mmmuze L..J wj&j + WoL..J a . Lllj 
j>O j>O Xj 
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s.t. -~s .. •Lix . >!1R. 
I) J - / 
j>O 
~hl ~hl 0::; Lix
1
. ::; x
1
. - x
1
. (when TO ::; 0) or x. - x . ::; Lix . ::; 0 (when To > 0) forJ.>0 ax . 1 1 1 a . -
1 XJ 
The second constraint ensures that the operation of control will reduce the risk of the system. 
The optimization problem can be solved using linear programming method. Thus, the operation of 
each control can be determined. 
Step 5. Update the system states, and check whether there are violations, if there are still violations, 
go to step 1. Otherwise, the corrective action is found. The results will be printed out and program exits 
at this time. 
3.4 An Illustrative Example 
To test the method described above, we use a modified version of IEEE 96 Reliability Test System. 
The system we used here is different from the system reported in [5] in the following aspects. 
• Line 11-13 is removed 
• Shift 480 MW ofload from buses 14, 15, 19, 20 to bus 13 
• Change the rate of branches A22 and A23 from 500MV A to 400MV A. 
Assume there are VAR sources and shunt reactors on those non-generator buses, and these 
maximum and minimum reactive power that can be changed at those buses are in table 3-3. Other 
controls used here are voltages and active power output at generator buses 
The modified IEEE Reliability Test System - 1996 is shown in the figure 3-3. In our calculation, 
we treat bus 13 as slack bus. 
In step 1, we calculated the low voltage and overload risks, which are shown in table 3-4 and table 
3-5. 
Here, we choose the limit of component risk as 0.9. That is, if a component has a risk larger than 
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Table 3-3 Data of VAR sources at Each PQ bus 
Bus ID Qmax (MVAR) Qmin (MVAR) 
3 130 -60 
4 210 -110 
5 70 -70 
6 110 -110 
8 · 120 -65 
9 120 -52 
10 160 -160 
11 120 -120 
12 220 -62 
16 80 -130 
17 320 -120 
19 470 -70 
20 120 -82 
24 420 -42 
0.9, then it is working insecurely. From the two tables above, we found that buses 3, 4 and 11 have risks 
that are larger than or near 0.9, branches A22 and A23 have risks larger than 0.9. 
Step 2. Calculate the risk sensitivities to controls. 
Step 3. Select effective controls. According to calculation, we get the effective controls for those 
components with high risks as follows. 
For bus 3, the four most effective control variables are VAR sources at buses 24, 4, 3 and generator 
voltage at bus 15. 
For bus 4, the four most effective control variables are VAR sources at buses 4, 24, 12 and 9. 
For bus 11, the four most effective control variables are VAR sources at buses 4, 24, 12 and 9. 
Thus, the effective controls to reduce the low voltage risks are VAR sources at buses 3, 4, 9, 12, 24 
and generator voltage at bus 15. 
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Figure 3.4 Modified IEEE One Area RTS-96 
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Table 3-4 Low voltage risks 
Bus Voltage(pu) Risk 
3 0.935 1.291 
4 0.963 0.737 
6 0.9996 0.00949 
8 0.9996 0.00949 
9 0.973 0.543 
11 0.940 1.207 
12 0.982 0.143 
24 0.977 0.456 
Table 3-5. Overload risks 
Branch Branch Risk flow(MW) 
A22 428.7 1.717 
A23 429.96 1.749 
For branch A22, the four most effective control variables are active power outputs of generator 
buses 23, 18, 21 and 16. 
For branch A23, the four most effective control variables are active power outputs of generator 
buses 18, 21, 7, and 23. 
Thus, the effective controls to eliminate the overload problems are active power outputs of 
generator buses 7, 16, 18, 21 and 23. 
Step 4. Determine the operation of each control through linear programrrnng method. Here we are 
not going define coefficients for each control separately. Instead, we define the cost coefficients of 
controls in the following simplified way: The cost coefficients of generator voltages are 1. The cost 
coefficients of VAR sources at PQ buses are 2. The cost coefficients of active power outputs at 
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generator buses are 3. The weight of Riskrn-Wo, can be chosen according the preference of the 
operator. In this example, we choose w0=0, 1, 1.5 and calculate the corrective actions respectively. 
Step 5. After solving the optimization problem using linear programming, we update the system 
results and check the violations again. If there's no violation, print out the results and exit the procedure. 
Otherwise, we go to step 1 and begin a new iteration. 
In the simulation, the numbers of iterations that are required for w0=0, 1, 1.5 are 2, 2, 3, 
respectively. Different corrective actions are calculated for different values of w0. Here, the results of 
corrective actions are shown in the following tables. 
Table 3-6. Voltages and low voltage risks of buses after the corrective action 
Bus 
Voltage (pu) Low voltage risk 
w0=0 W0=1 Wo=l.5 w0=0 w0=1 Wo=l.5 
3 0.956 0.995 1.003 0.880 0.0995 0 
4 0.972 0.973 0.983 0.563 0.543 0.332 
6 0.00337 1.004 1.007 0 0 0 
8 0.977 0.978 0.983 0.454 0.444 0.342 
9 0.955 0.957 0.976 0.900 0.865 0.489 
11 0.989 0.990 0.995 0.220 0.208 0.0908 
12 0.997 0.998 1.003 0.0508 0.0367 0 
24 0.00484 1.020 1.023 0 ·o 0 
Table 3-7. Branch flows and overload risks of branches after the corrective action 
Branch Flow (MW) Overload risk 
Branch 
w0=0 W0=1 Wo=l.5 w0=0 Wo=l Wo=l.5 
A22 -366.4 -370.7 -370.8 0.159 0.266 0.271 
A23 -396.0 -396.0 -396.0 0.900 0.900 0.900 
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Table 3-8 Control actions and their corresponding operation costs and total risks 
Corrective Action Wo=0 w0=1 Wo=l.5 
~QI 0 0.73 0.73 
~Q6 0.257 0 0.54 
~Vs 0.0247 0.0247 0.0247 
~P16 -1.007 -0.0660 -0.0671 
~Pis -0.407 0 0 
M21 0 -1.258 -1.241 
Total operation costs 4.781 5.455 6.490 
Total risk 4.128 3.364 2.425 
From Table 3-6 and 3-7, we can see that all violations are eliminated for all three courses of 
corrective actions. From Table 3-8, we can see that as the weight of total risk in the objective function 
of step 4, the total operation cost increases and the total risk decreases. This is exactly what we want. As 
the weight of total risk increase, we prefer more to the corrective action that reduces the total risk more. 
In Table 3-8, ~Qi, Vi, Mi are the amount of reactive power, generator voltage and active power 
increased at bus i respectively. Only 6 controls are shown in Table 3-8, while in step 2, we selected 11 
controls. The other five controls are not changed in any of the three courses of corrective actions. 
Thus, by varying the weight of total risks, we can get different courses of corrective actions. The 
control center operator can choose one of them based on his preferences to operation costs and security 
of the whole system. 
3.6 Conclusions and Comparison with Deterministic Method 
The risk-based method to find corrective action here is similar to deterministic methods in several 
ways. In risk-based method, the sensitivities of component risks under current condition are used for 
selection of controls. In deterministic method, voltage sensitivities or branch flow sensitivities are used 
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for selection of effective controls. As the linear model of severity function is chosen, the controls 
selected in two ways doesn't vary much. After the corrective action, all component risks will be within 
the limits for risk-based method, while all voltage violations and branch flow violations will be 
eliminated for deterministic method. 
There are also some differences between these two methods. In deterministic method, only those 
components with violations of deterministic limit are considered. In risk based approach here, as a 
continuous severity function are used, more components are considered in addition to those components 
with risks out of limits. For corrective action, deterministic method will not differentiate the system's 
condition when all deterministic violation is removed. Thus the objective is normally to minimize the 
amounts of operation or the operation costs. For the risk based method here, though all the component 
risk violations are removed, the system's security level can still be different. This can be seen from the 
numerical example above. Three courses of corrective action calculated eliminate all violations. But the 
total risks after the different corrective actions are different, which represents different security level of 
the power system. By minimizing an objective function that incorporating operation costs and the total 
risk, we arrive at a tradeoff between economy and security. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we provide a hybrid method that incorporate heuristic rules and numerical 
calculations to search for appropriate corrective actions. 
Heuristic rules that utilize sensitivities of component risks with respect to controls and operating 
reserves are adopted here to select controls to operate. In this way, controls with high sensitivities but 
very small operating reserve won't be chosen. This can reduce the number of controls to be operated, 
which is beneficial to real practice. The controls selected in this way will be highly effective in returning 
the component risks back to within their limits. 
After selection of controls, linear programming method is used to determine how to operate these 
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controls. Here the objective is to minimize a weighted sum of operation costs and the total risk of the 
system. An illustrative numerical example is shown using a modified version of IEEE Reliability Test 
System- I 996. By varying the weight coefficient of total risk, we get different courses of corrective 
actions. From the results, we can see that the higher the weight coefficient of total risk results higher 
operation costs and lower _total risk after corrective action calculated. The operator can choose 
appropriate weight coefficients and decide on the corrective action based on his own preference. 
53 
CHAPTER 4 PREVENTIVE ACTION SELECTION 
4.1 Introduction 
For the power system, when there are no operational violations in the pre-contingency condition 
and security violations exist in post contingency conditions, preventive actions are needed to enhance 
the security of the system. A great deal of research has been done to provide preventive actions for 
different security violations. For steady state security problems, security constrained optimal power 
flow (SCOPF) is an important tool for implementation of preventive actions. Allen J. Wood and Bruce 
F. Wollenberg briefly described the method in [26]. The SCOPF solves an optimal power flow with (n-
0) constraints first, and then the C(!nstraints of several worst contingencies are included. The OPF and 
each contingency power flow are re-executed until the OPF has solved with all contingency constraints 
met. This process continues until no new contingency with violations are found. The SCOPF ensures 
that no violations of components exist even under occurrence of any one contingency. In [7], a security 
enhancement package developed by ESCA Corporation is described that utilizes SCOPF to provide 
recommendations to control center operators. There is also some research on other kinds of security 
problems. In [34,35], the preventive actions for voltage stability problems are explored. References 
[36,37] deal with transient security problems. 
In our work, the security of the system is assessed by a risk-based approach. Risk based security 
assessment considers both the impact and the probability of the contingencies, while deterministic 
method doesn't consider the factor of probability. Thus, the risk-based approach can provide more 
detailed and accurate quantitative information than deterministic method. Previous research shows that 
the security boundary determined by the deterministic method is not risk equal. We believe that the 
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quantitative information provided by risk will facilitate more consistent decision-making. Therefore, 
here we take a risk-based approach to implement preventive action decision making. For simplification, 
only steady security problems - low voltages and overloads are considered in this work. But this does 
not mean that the approach is limited to these kinds of security problems. We are optimistic about 
incorporating the voltage collapse and transient stability problems into the future work. 
4.2 Formulation of the problem 
The objective of the preventive action is to enhance the security level of the power system while 
considering operation costs. It is natural that when the security level of the system is low, the preventive 
action should be triggered. A very good index that reflects the security of the power system is total post-
contingency risk. The index measures the mean effect of all contingencies by considering both their 
effects and probabilities. We predefine a threshold for the total risk of contingencies. If the value of this 
index is above the valve value, we think that the power system is not secure enough and preventive 
action will be triggered to enhance the security. 
It is desirable that preventive actions consider both the economy and security factors of the power 
system. The economy factor here is the operation cost. To consider the security level of the power 
system, we can consider two aspects, total post-contingency risk, which reflects the mean effect of all 
contingencies, and variance of contingencies, which reflects the variability of the effects of different 
contingencies. Mean and variance can give decision makers a good view of the effects of an alternative 
with uncertainties. In the area of investment, Harry Markowitz proposed the mean-variance method in 
1952, which utilizes the mean and variance of return as criteria to decide on selection of portfolios. In 
the method, the set of investments (portfolio) that has maximum expected return and minimum variance 
is most preferred by the investor. Similarly, we prefer that the power system have lowest total risk of 
contingencies and lowest variance of contingencies. 
In ( 1-4), total post-contingency risk is defined as the expected total severity under the condition that 
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one of the contingencies will happen. The index incorporates both the impact and the probability of each 
contingency and reflects the comprehensive effect caused by the all the contingency considered. 
Variance of contingencies is the variance of the total severity under the condition that one of the 
contingencies will happen. From [27], it can be calculated as follows. 
VarianceTc = Var(SLVT + SOLT IE vent* 0) 
= Var(E(SLVT + SOLTIEvent * 0)) + E(Var(SLVT + SOLTIEvent -:;c 0)) 
From the expression above, we can see that the variance consists of two components: the uncertainty of 
contingency Var(E(SLVT + SOLT I Event -:;c 0)) and the uncertainty of the operation condition under 
contingencies E(Var(SLVT + SOLTIEvent -:;c 0)). As the time interval we consider is not long (one 
hour), the uncertainty of the operating condition under contingencies is much less than the uncertainty 
of contingencies. We can ignore the latter part without losing much accuracy. Thus, we have 
VarianceTc z Var(E(SLVT +SOLrlEvent * 0)) = LP'i·Risk~ -(LP'i·RiskTi )' (4-1) 
1>0 J 
Where p'i = Probability(Event = ilEvent -:;c 0) = __f!J_ 
1- Po 
The above two indices, risk and variance, give us a good view on the performance of the power 
system under the condition that one contingency will happen. Also, in the last chapter, we introduced 
the total pre-contingency risk, which reflects the security level of the power system under the pre-
contingency condition. Together with the operation cost, we have therefore four attributes to measure 
the desirability of preventive action from different perspectives. Thus the implementation of the 
preventive action is basically a multi-criterion decision making problem with these four criteria. We are 
going to tackle the decision problem in two steps: generating some alternatives for further analysis, and 
evaluating the alternatives using different methods. In our approach, we don't want to act as a decision 
maker for control center operators, identifying a single "best" choice. Instead, we provide some choices 
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on how to implement preventive actions, and some information on these choices. It is the responsibility 
of the operator to analyze the information and make his final decision on what to do. 
4.3 Risk based approach to implement preventive control 
In the context of risk security assessment, when the total risk of contingencies is higher than a 
predefined valve value, the preventive action should be considered. We are going to tackle the 
implementation of preventive action in four main steps. The approach we take is shown in the dotted 
box in figure 4.1. 
The first step is calculation of sensitivities. The information of sensitivities is valuable in that it will 
be used to select effective controls and to solve the vector optimization problem. This step is a necessary 
preparation for the second and third steps. 
The second step is selection of effective controls. As is stated before, for power system operation in 
real practice, the number of controls that can be operated is limited. So this step is necessary to ensure 
that a practical number of subset of all controls is selected. Also, this will reduce the complexity of the 
vector optimization problem in step 3. The first two steps are necessary for the third step, which is to 
generate alternatives of preventive actions. 
In the third step, we get the alternatives of preventive actions by calculating the efficient solutions of 
a vector optimization problem. Ad hoc weighting method is used where some representative sets of 
weights are assigned to different objective functions. A gradient method is used here to solve the 
different optimization problems with different weights. 
In the fourth step, we evaluate the alternatives calculated in step 3 by using different methods. 
Different methods will produce different rankings for the alternatives. By analyze the different results, 
the operator can know more about the alternatives and his own preferences, which will be beneficial for 
the operator to make a right decision with more confidence. 
In the following subsections, we explain each step in more detail. 
Implementation of 
corrective action 
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System state 
Risk based security 
assessment 
Calculation of 
sensitivities 
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efficient solutions of vector optimization 
problems as alternatives to choose from 
Evaluate the alternatives 
by different methods 
Make a final decision 
and implement 
preventive action 
Figure 4.1 Implementation of preventive action 
No preventive action 
is needed , stop 
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4.3.1 Calculation of sensitivities 
When the total post-contingency risk is higher than a predefined value, we think there are security 
problems for the power system and preventive action should be taken. The main objective for the 
preventive action is to reduce the total risk of contingencies. Thus, sensitivities of total risk of 
contingencies with respect to controls needs to be calculated. In the meantime, if we use the gradient 
search method to solve the optimization problem (4-2), the sensitivities of RiskTO and sensitivities of 
VarianceTc with respect to controls also need to be calculated. 
The sensitivities of total risk under current condition can be calculated as 
dRiskTo = L dRiskLVio + L dRiskOLko 
dx i dx k dx 
The sensitivities of total risk of contingencies can be calculated as 
, (~ dRiskLVu dRiskOLkj ) = £..J p ( £..J---- + £..J 
J>O i dx k dx 
From ( 4-1 ), the sensitivities of total variance of all contingencies can be calculated as 
dVarianceTc 
dx 
, . k dRiskTi 2(~ , R. k = £..J2p i·Rzs Ti---- £.JP;" zs Ti 
i>O dx i>O 
i>O 
, . dRiskTi . , dRiskTi = £..J2p ;-RzskTi ----2RzskTc £..J pi ---
i>O dx i>O dx 
' ( . . )oRiskTi = £..J 2 p i RzskTi - RzskTc 
i>O dx 
dx 
(4-3) 
(4-4) 
(4-5) 
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43.2 Selection of Controls 
When the total risk of all contingencies is high, preventive action needs to be taken. It is natural that 
those controls chosen should be capable of reducing the total risk of all contingencies. Thus, the 
efficiency of reducing the total risk of all contingencies can be used to rank the controls. In the 
following, we are going to calculate the total post-contingency risk that a control can reduce. 
For a control x, we can know how to operate the control to reduce the total risk of all contingencies 
from the sign of sensitivity of total risk of all contingencies with respect to the control. If the sensitivity 
is positive, then we need to decrease x, otherwise, we need to increase x. From the upper and lower 
bounds of x, we can know the operating reserve of the control. Then the amount of total risk that can be 
reduced by the control x can be calculated roughly through the product of sensitivity of total risk and the 
operating reserve. The result calculated will be optimistic. Actually the risk cannot be reduced so much 
because the sensitivity magnitude may decrease in the range of operating reserve. We can see this from 
equation (4-4). Without loss of generality, let's suppose the RiskLV21=0.6, dRiskLV21 = -1.2 and dx 
operating reserve is 1.3. Then we can see that when Lix = 0.5, RiskL V 21 will reduce to around zero. If x 
increase is more than 0.5, RiskL V 21 will remain zero instead of keep decreasing. Thus, we have 
dRiskLV21 ----= 0 after x increased more than 0.5. From this perspective and (4-4), the product of total dx 
risk sensitivity and the operating reserve is an optimistic assessment of efficiency of the control. To 
calculate the amount of total risk that can be reduced by control x, the following formula will provide a 
more accurate assessment. 
MiskTc = £.J p j £.J min ----Lix, RiskLVii + £.J min 1 Lix, RiskOLkj (4-6) . (~ (dRiskLVii J (dRiskOLk. J) 
j i dx k dx 
By ranking the controls through their efficiencies in reducing the total risk of all contingencies, we 
can get those potentially good controls. Another problem we need to consider is that operation of these 
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controls won't cause other operation limits violated. Sometimes the operation of a control will reduce 
the total post-contingency risk and increase the risk of some components under current condition at the 
same time. In this case, new violations of operation limits may accompany the reduction of total risk of 
all contingencies, which is not we want. So we have to recheck the controls chosen through the rankings 
of efficiencies and eliminate those controls that may cause new violations. 
The way we recheck the controls is described as below. 
Without loss of generality, we consider a control x with a positive sensitivity of total risk of all 
contingencies. Then we need to decrease x to reduce the risk of contingencies. Let's assume that the 
operating reserve is Llx. We can calculate components' pre-contingency risks when the control is 
operated fully to its limit. 
. dRiskLV. 
RiskLVi0 (x + fu) = RzskLViO (x) + 10 • fu dx 
RiskOLkO (x + Llx) = RiskOLko (x) + dRiskOLko · Llx ax 
Checking the risks of components after the change of control, if there exist a component risk that is 
out of the predefined component risk limit, then the control cannot be chosen for preventive action, 
because it may cause new violations while reducing the total risk of all contingences. If there's no 
component risk that is out of the predefined limit, then the control is chosen. 
Through ranking of efficiencies and rechecking the controls, we select a set of controls that is used 
to implement the preventive actions. 
4.3.3 Generation of alternatives 
Here the desirability of a course of preventive action is measured by four attributes: operation costs, 
total post-contingency risk. variance of contingencies and total pre-contingency risk. In this step, we are 
going to provide some alternatives from which the operators are to choose. It is a vector optimization 
problem, with the following form. 
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Minimize (Cost, RiskTO, RiskTC, VarianceTc) 
Subject to: Riskio < LR (for all components of the power system) 
Here Cost denotes the operation costs of the preventive action, RiskTO denotes the total risk under 
current condition, RiskTc denotes the total risk of contingencies and VarianceTc denotes the variance of 
contingencies. 
It is commonly accepted that people will choose one of the efficient solutions as their final decision. 
Thus, we are going to generate some alternatives that are efficient solutions of the vector optimization 
problem above. 
There are different ways to get efficient solutions of vector optimization problems. Two basic 
methods are the weighting method and the £ constraint method. Another method is goal attainment 
method, which can find all the efficient solutions even when the space of objectives is concave. But the 
method is much more complex than the weighting method and the £ constraint method. Here we are 
going to utilize the ad hoc weighting method to generate efficient solutions. The weighting method is 
very simple. Also, the weights can partly reflect the preferences of different objectives. In the ad hoc 
weighting method, by systematically choosing different sets of weights, we can get a versatile set of 
efficient solutions that can represent different attitudes .towards the objectives. This set will be very 
beneficial for the operator to have. 
Using the ad hoc weighting method, we assign different sets of (w0,w1,w2,w3) to the following 
single objective optimization problem. 
Minimize w0 Cost + w1RiskTo + w2RiskTc + w3 VarianceTc 
Subject to: Riskio < LR (for all components of the power system) 
By solving these optimization problems with different weights separately, we obtain efficient 
solutions that will act as the alternatives of preventive action. In this work, gradient search is utilized to 
solve the above optimization problem. 
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4.3.4 Evaluation of alternatives 
After some alternatives with different characters are generated, the operator needs to select one that 
is most appropriate, representing his preferences best. Evaluation of the alternatives is then necessary to 
make the decision. 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are many methods to rank the alternatives. Each method has its 
own preference structure and characteristics. They all have some advantages and disadvantages. We 
cannot say that one method is absolutely better than others. In our work, we suggest that different 
methods be used to rank the alternatives. As different methods are applied, the results may be different. 
Analysis of the difference in results will help the control operator know more about the alternatives and 
his preferences. Also, the alternative that ranks high in most methods will be a good option to choose. 
Given that multi-objective decision making depends on the preferences of the decision maker, can 
be no single "best" decision. Therefore we consider implementing a toolbox that contains those methods 
mentioned in chapter 2 so as to make provision of several good solutions. Due to the limit of the time, 
here two methods are used to evaluate the alternatives, value method and goal programming. We choose 
these two methods because they are both simple and very popularly used in practice. These two 
methods are enough to illustrate our ideas. 
In value method, the value function for each attribute represents the preference of different levels of 
the attribute. Here, we use two kinds of value functions to simulate two kinds of preferences of each 
attribute. An additive form of multi-attribute value function is used to evaluate the alternatives, where 
the weights of single attribute value functions represent the preferences of different attributes. 
In goal programming method, the 'distance' to the targets is used to measure the desirability of an 
alternative. There are different kinds of distances according to the value of parameter p in the expression 
In our work, we choose two values, I and 2, for p to illustrate this 
method. 
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This step provides lots of information of the alternatives for the operator. It is still the responsibility 
of the operator to make his or her own decision based on the analysis of the information. 
4.4 An Illustrative Example 
Here we use the same modified one area IEEE Reliability Test System, shown in figure 3-3, to 
illustrate the approach to search for and decide on preventive actions. In the last chapter, we found three 
corrective actions to eliminate the violations. The base case we considered here is a scenario after the 
implementation of corrective action with w0=0. 
We need to consider the effect of contingencies when preventive action is concerned. The 
contingency set considered here was limited to N-1 contingencies. This set includes three line outages:: 
• Outage of line A2 l, which is from bus 12 to bus 23, with an outage rate of 1.142 X 10-5 per hour. 
• Outage of line A22, which is from bus 13 to bus 23, with an outage rate of 5.594X 10-5 per hour. 
• Outage of line A20, which is from bus 12 to bus 13, with an outage rate of 4.242X 10-5 per hour. 
4.4.1 Generating alternatives 
After selecting controls based on the rules described in Section 4.4, we found the ten most efficient 
control variables are: real power output of generator at buses 21, 18 and 23, VAR source at PQ buses 
24, 4, 12, 9 and 3, real power output of generator at bus 15 and generator voltage at bus 14. The 
efficiencies of these controls are listed in descending order. 
Then all the selected controls are employed to solve the optimization problem formulated in (4-2). 
To calculate the operation costs, we define the cost coefficients for controls in the same way as in 
Section 3.5: the cost coefficients of generator voltages, VAR sources and real power outputs of 
generators are 1, 2 and 3 respectively. To get the non-inferior solutions of the vector optimization 
problem, we choose the following sets of weights: (w0, w1, w2, w3)E { w0, w1, w2, w3, w4 }={ (0.3, 0.2, 
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0.45, 0.05), (0.4, 0.15, 0.4, 0.05), (0.5, 0.15, 0.3, 0.05), (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1), (0.2, 0.3, 0.45, 0.05)}. 
By applying these sets of weights to the different objectives and utilizing the gradient search 
method, we can calculate some representative alternatives of preventive actions. The table 4-1 gives out 
the solutions corresponding to the above sets of weights. In the table, a value given out means that the 
corresponding control variable should be increased by that value. For example, ~P 1s= -0.3245 means an 
operation to decrease the real power output at generator bus 15 by 0.3245 pu. The table 4-2 gives out the 
values of different objectives achieved for each preventive action alternative. From the table, we can 
notice the fact that the larger the weight of an objective is, the smaller the value of the objective 
achieves. This is because we are minimizing these objectives. 
Table 4-1 Preventive actions corresponding to some representative sets of weights 
I~ w0=(0.3, 0.2, W1=(0.4, 0.15, w2=(0.5, 0.15, w3=(0. l, 0.3, W4=(0.2, 0.3, 0.45, 0.05) 0.4, 0.05) 0.3, 0.05) 0.5, 0.1) 0.45, 0.05) 
~V14 0.05299 0.05299 0.05299 0.05299 0.05298 
~Pis -0.3245 0.04608 0 -0.6940 0.6926 
~Q3 0.7300 0.6731 0.7300 0.4656 0.7300 
~Q9 0.1995 0.02725 0 0.2301 0.3660 
~Q12 0 0 0 0 0 
~Q4 0.6317 0.3404 0 0.3643 0.6133 
~Q24 0 0 0 0.07693 0 
~P23 -0.2173 0.03143 0 -0.6900 0.6002 
~Pis -0.3141 0.01984 0 -0.6858 0.6808 
~P21 -0.2861 0 0 -0.6797 0.6714 
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Table 4-2 Objectives achieved for different preventive actions 
w0=(0.3, 0.2, W 1=(0.4, 0.15, W2=(0.5, 0.15, w3=(0. l, 0.3, w4=(0.2, 0.3, 
0.45, 0.05) 0.4, 0.05) 0.3, 0.05) 0.5, 0.1) 0.45, 0.05) s 
s 
Cost 5.093 1.439 0.8360 9.491 9.750 
RiskT0 0.6417 1.508 2.059 0.3095 0.1249 
RiskTc 2.589 4.824 5.656 1.430 1.069 
Varc 2.249 4.082 4.112 0.1839 0.3127 
4.4.2 Ranking the alternatives 
Here we use two commonly used multi-criteria decision making methods to rank the options 
calculated: value method and goal programming method. These two methods are widely used in real 
practice and their characteristics are discussed in Chapter 2. 
• Value Method 
For value method, we have to develop a value function for each criterion that represents the 
decision maker's preference for different levels of the criterion. For decision makers that are not risk 
neutral, the value functions are non-linear. There are different forms of value functions. Here we use 
exponential value functions to represent decision makers' preferences. For an attribute A with value of 
x, the value function can be expressed as V A(x)=a+becx_ The coefficients of a, b, c can be determined by 
three points. 
For the attribute of operation cost, we suppose that the decision maker considers the value of cost to 
be 1, 0.5 and O when cost is equal to 0, 3 and 10 respectively. Then the coefficients can be calculated 
through a set of equations. Here we get YcostCx)= -0.1978+ 1.1978e-0·1801 x_ 
In the same way, let's suppose the decision maker's attitude towards total risk under current 
condition can be expressed as Vriskrn(0.5)=1, Ynskrn(l.5)=1 and Vriskrn(4)=0. Then the value functi_on for 
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total risk under current condition is V riskTo(y)= -0.1624+ l .5398e-0·5624Y. 
Assuming V risk Tc( I)= 1, V risk Tc( 3 )=0 .5 and V risk rd 6 )=0, we get the value function for total risk of 
contingencies V riskTc(z)= -0.7840+ 2.1029e-0·1644z. Assuming Yvarc(0. l)=l, YvarcO)=0.5 and Yvarc(4.5)=0, 
we get the value function for variance of contingencies Yvarc(u)= -0.04286+ l.1213e-0·7254u. 
The attitude of the decision maker above is risk-averse. The value functions for his preferences 
towards different attribute are shown as the solid lines in figures 4.1-4.4 
We can suppose there is another decision maker with a risk-seeking attitude. His attitudes towards 
the four attributes can be expressed as: 
YcostC0)=l, Ycosc(7)=0.5, YcoscO0)=0; YriskTo(0.5)=1, YriskTo(3)=0.5, YriskTo(4)=0; 
YriskTc(l)=l, YriskTc(4)=0.5, YriskTc(6)=0; Yvarc(0.1)=1, Yvarc(3.5)=0.5, Yvarc(4.5)=0. 
We can get the value functions as follows: 
YcoscCx)= l.1978-0.1977e0··1801 x 
V riskTO(y)= l. l 624-0. l 226e0·5624Y 
V riskTc(z)= l.784 l-0.6652e0·1644z 
Yvarc(U)= 1.0657 -0.06 I 64e0·6333u 
The attitudes of the decision maker are shown as the dotted lines in the figures 4.1 to 4.4. 
The above single-attribute value functions captures the preferences regarding different levels of the 
attributes. Multi-attribute value functions consider the effects of all value functions at a time. Two 
kinds of widely applied multi-attribute value functions are multiplicative and additive value functions. 
For simplification, we choose an additive value function to evaluate the alternatives, which has a form 
as follows: 
TVi = W0Ycos1(Xi)+w1V riskTO(Yi)+w2V riskTc(zi)+w3 V vadui) 
The weights lies between 0 and 1 and the sum of the weights is 1. The weights of the additive 
function can be chosen by a combination of gamble and indifference tradeoff methods. 
Here, we assume an additive function of TV= 0.35YcosiCx)+0.15VriskTO(x)+0.4VriskTc(x)+0.1Vvar2Cx). 
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The results of the value method with two attitudes are shown in Table 4-3. 
• Goal programming method 
In this method, a goal or a target value Gi for each one of the criteria is specified. The alternatives 
{ / }I/ P are ranked by the distance to the goal which is in a form of ti [w; IG; - V; (All]P 
This method usually assumes linear value functions. Here we assume the value functions for the 
four attributes as follow 
Operation cost: 
Total risk under current condition: V 2(0.5)= 1, Vi( 4)=0 Vi(y)=l.0714-0.1428y 
Total risk of contingencies: V J(z)= 1.2 - 0 .2z 
Variance of contingencies: V4(0.2)=1, V4(4.5)=0 V 4(u)= 1.0465- 0.2326u 
Here we suppose the operator sets goals of 1 for operation cost, 1.5 for total risk under current 
condition, 2 for the total risk of contingencies and 0.5 for the variance of contingencies. Then we have 
G 1= 0.9, G2= 0.8571, G3= 0.8 and G4= 0.9302. Also, let ' s suppose that the operator think the total risk 
of contingencies is four times important as variance of contingencies, two times important as total risk 
under current condition, and more than one third as important than the operation costs. The 
corresponding set of normalized weights for the four attributes are 0.3, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.1 respectively. 
Here, we calculate the distance for p=l and 2. The results are shown in Table 4-3. 
• Analysis of results 
From Table 4-2, we can see the following facts: For value method, the alternative 5 and I have the 
highest additive value for attitude A and B respectively. For goal programming, the alternative I ranked 
best for p= I and p=2. Alternative 3 always ranks the worst for the two methods. Base on these facts , 
the operator may choose preventive actions from one of alternatives 1 and 5. 
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Table 4-3. Evaluating alternatives by value method and goal pFogramming method 
Value method (Additive Value) Goal programming (Distance) 
Risk-a verse Risk-seeking p=l p=2 
1 (w=w0) 0.489 0.781 0.221 0.138 
2 (w=w 1) 0.397 0.611 0.337 0.242 
3 (w=w2) 0.359 0.517 0.412 0.306 
4 (w=w3) 0.621 0.666 0.327 0.260 
5 (w=w3) 0.671 0.669 0.366 0.274 
4.5 Comparison with deterministic method 
The risk-based approach we used here is similar to deterministic method in that they both consider 
the security of power systems in terms of contingencies. In both methods, when the power system works 
well in pre-contingency condition but has some security problems in it under some contingency, 
preventive action should be taken to enhance the security of the power system. 
The risk-based approach we take is different from deterministic methods in the way of how the 
security is considered when the contingencies are concerned. 
Deterministic method considers only the impacts of contingencies while risk based approach 
consider both the impact and probability of the contingencies. Thus a contingency with lower impact 
but a high probability may be worse than another contingency with higher impact while low probability. 
Deterministic methods cannot capture this character. 
The deterministic method (SCOPF) considers that the power system is secure when there will be no 
security violations if any (N-1) post-contingency state happens. In deterministic methods, all cases that 
satisfy all constraints of contingencies are considered secure. There is no way to distinguish those cases 
in terms of security level. The SCOPF is essentially a single objective optimization problem with 
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constraints of contingencies and some other constraints. The best preventive action is the one with 
minimal operation costs. In our risk-based approach, we quantitatively assess the security of power 
systems by using total risk of contingencies and variance of contingencies. These two indices give out 
both the mean effect of all contingencies and the variability of the effects of different contingencies. 
With these more refined and detailed information, those cases derived from SCOPF can be 
distinguished in terms of the security level. It is natural that we will prefer those cases with low risks 
and variances to those cases with high risks and variances. Thus, we have more criteria other than 
operation costs in deciding the best preventive actions. The implementation of preventive action then 
becomes a multi-criterion decision making problem. The best preventive action is the one that achieves 
best tradeoff between economy and security. This will surely be different from the preventive action 
provided by SCOPF, in which the only criterion is operation costs. 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we provide a 2-step scheme to aid the operator to decide on appropriate preventive 
actions. In the first step, we calculate some alternatives of preventive actions for the operator to choose 
from. Based on the risk sensitivities and operating reserve, an appropriate subset of controls that are 
highly capable to reduce the total risk are chosen. The selection of controls ensures that a practical 
number of controls are used and also reduces the size and complexity of the problem. Then employing 
these controls, we solve a vector optimization problem through ad hoc weighting method. In the vector 
optimization problem, we consider the economy and security of the power system operation together. 
Operation cost reflects the economy factor. Total pre-contingency risk, total post-contingency risk and 
variance of contingences reflect the security of the power system. These indices measure the current 
working condition, the comprehensive effect of all contingencies and the variability of effects of 
different contingencies respectively. In the second step, the desirability of different alternatives is 
further assessed by using different ranking methods. By study on the results of different alternatives in 
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different methods and efforts to resolving the differences among methods, the operator know more 
about the characters of alternatives and understand his preferences better. Thus a right decision on the 
operation of power system can be made with more confidence. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Contributions of this work 
In this work, we have implemented a scheme for preventive and corrective actions in the context of 
risk based security assessment. This scheme provides advice and suggestions to the control center 
operator on whether and how the preventive and corrective actions should be implemented. 
To make a high quality decision on power system operation, knowledge of decision theories and 
techniques are necessary. As economy and security are two factors that need to be considered during the 
decision process, the decision problem on preventive and corrective actions is essentially a multi-criteria 
decision making problem. After a short introduction of decision theory, we did a thorough survey and 
discussion on the various multi-criterion decision making methods, their characteristics, advantages and 
disadvantages. Also, as our objective is to provide the operator with some alternatives, not simply rank 
some given alternatives, the problem is treated as a multi-objective decision problem, or vector 
optimization problem. There are two basic kinds of methods to generate non-inferior solutions. Here 
we choose the ad hoc weighting method to find some representative sets of efficient solutions and then 
apply different methods to rank them. In this way, we obtain comprehensive information of these 
alternatives, which is beneficial for making a final decision. 
For the deterministic approach, corrective action is necessary when the power system is in an 
emergency state, that is, when there are violations of voltages or branch flows. For the risk based 
approach, we define such a component risk limit that if the risk of a component is out of the limit, the 
component is operating insecurely. If due to some reason there exist violations of component risks, we 
are going to trigger corrective action to return them back to within the limits. As only limited number of 
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controls can be operated in real time, it is a critical problem to select those effective controls. Based on 
some heuristic rules, risk sensitivities and the operating reserves of controls are considered together for 
selection of controls. Linear programming is then used to decide how to operate these controls with an 
objective of weighted sum of the operation cost and total risk under current condition. In the developed 
risk model, continuous severity functions are used to model the operator's preference to the 
performances of components. While the deterministic method only considers those components out of 
the operation limits, the risk-based method here also considers some components within the limits 
(those component with risk within the component limit) in addition. In the linear programming method, 
we considered the total pre-contingency risk, which can reflect the operating condition of the overall 
system. This is another advantage of the implementation of corrective actions on risk-based approach to 
the deterministic methods before. 
The total post-contingency risk 1s a good measurement of the comprehensive impact of all 
contingencies. When all components are operating normally (all component risks are within the 
predefined limit), but the total post-contingency risk is high, preventive actions are needed to enhance 
the security level of the power system. To implement preventive action in real practice, we also need to 
consider the number of controls to be operated. Risk sensitivities, operating reserves and post-
contingency component risks are combined to rank the efficiencies of different controls. In the selection 
of controls, we recheck the controls to make sure that the operation of the controls won't cause new 
violations of component risk limits. Then the problem we face is to employ those controls to achieve the 
optimal tradeoff between economy and security. The total pre-contingency risk, the total post-
contingency risk and the variance of all contingencies measure the security of the system in three 
aspects. Operation costs reflect the economy of the preventive action. These four values are used as 
criteria of evaluation of preventive actions. We divide the process into two steps. First we treat the 
problem as a vector optimization problem, using ad hoc weighting method to find some sets of 
representative efficient solutions. Secondly, we treat the problem as a multi-attribute decision making 
1 
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problem with fixed alternatives and apply different methods to rank those options. The method of 
implementation of preventive action is different from most previous methods in several ways. Most 
previous methods consider the impacts of contingencies only. The method here considers both the 
impact and the probability of the contingencies. Most previous methods rank the contingencies based on 
their severity and then handle the contingencies one at a time, thus the effects of some contingencies are 
not considered. Here we capture the comprehensive effect of all contingencies by using the total risk of 
all contingencies and the variance of all contingencies. Also, by applying decision-making techniques, 
the method developed here not only provides the operator with options to choose but also assesses those 
options using different methods. Based on the information given, the operator can know more about the 
options and understand his own preference more. In this way, the operator can make decisions more 
confidently and the decisions made will be more consistent and of higher quality. 
Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the methods developed above using a modified 
version of the IEEE Reliability Test System 1996. 
5.2 Suggestions for future work 
In this work, we spent our efforts on providing a decision tool for the control center operator to 
decide on the problems of when and how implement corrective and preventive actions. While some 
progress is achieved in this attempt, there are still some places to be refined and some new areas to be 
explored further. Some suggestions for future research are as follows . 
• Security problem involved 
In this work, we only considered the steady state security problems of power system, low voltage 
and overload problems. It will be more beneficial to the operator if other kinds of security problems are 
considered. Some research has been done to assess the risk of voltage collapse and transient stability 
problems. We can consider including these two kinds of security problems into our scheme of 
implementation of corrective and preventive actions. 
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• Severity function 
For simplification, linear severity functions are assumed to model the impact of low voltage and 
overload problems. Other choices of severity functions are also possible. More research can be done on 
more complicated forms of severity functions, such as quadratic functions. And comparison can be done 
to determine what form is more appropriate. 
• Preventive and corrective control 
In this work, the controls here we considered are real power output at generator buses and various 
sources of reactive power at PQ buses and generator's terminal voltages. Some other controls can be 
integrated into the scheme later, such as phase shifter, tap changer of transformers. The risk sensitivities 
to these controls can be calculated in a similar way. Network switching is another kind of preventive 
and corrective action that is used in real practice [6][7]. It will be of great interest to do some research 
on how to apply the operation in the context of risk based security assessment. 
• Decision making techniques 
As decision-making techniques can be applied to various aspects of everyday activities, lots of 
research is done in the area, and there are many new developments. Recently, some people work on the 
problem of multi-criteria decision making in the fuzzy environment. As human being's preferences are 
subjective, inconsistent and hard to express, an appropriate way to express the preferences could be 
using fuzzy sets. The application of fuzzy set theory into multi-criteria decision-making can provide us 
with a new view of multi-criteria decision making from another perspective. As another kind of multi-
criteria decision making method, the interactive methods are widely applied into decision problems of 
real life. It will be of great interest to apply interactive methods to solve our problem here. Also, there 
are many techniques for generating non-inferior solutions of vector optimization problems. It will be 
very helpful if more research is done to find the most efficient and appropriate method of generating 
non-inferior solutions for the problem of implementation of P/C actions. 
j 
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APPENDIX A CALCULATION OF VOLTAGE AND 
BRANCH FLOW SENSITIVITIES 
To calculate risk sensitivities with respect to control variables, the derivatives of risk with respect to 
voltage or branch flow and the derivatives of voltage or branch flow with respect to control variables 
need to be calculated. It is already covered in the previous chapters how to calculate risk sensitivities to 
voltage and branch flow. In the following part, we will show how to calculate voltage and branch flow 
sensitivities with respect to control variables. The formulas derived below are based on AC power flow. 
• Voltage sensitivities 
I. Voltage sensitivities with respect to reactive and active power 
aP]-i av 
aQ 
av 
The above V represents the vector of amplitudes of voltages at PQ buses, 0 represents the vector of 
angle of voltages at all buses except slack buses. 
2. Voltage sensitivities with respect to voltages at PV buses 
dP dP dP 
av' ~v'+ ae av [~ 0 ]- 0 aQ aQ aQ ~V - · 
_av '_ _ ae av_ 
a e -
dV' d V V ' , we have 
_ a V '_ 
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[ 
aP l [ aP aP ][ ae l av' + ae av av' =O 
aQ aQ aQ av 
- - --
av' ae av av' 
[ 
ae l [aP aP]- 1[ aP l Thus we get av' = - ae av av' , av aQ aQ aQ - -- -
av' ae av av' 
In the above, V and 0 have the same meaning as before while V 'represents the amplitudes of the 
voltages at PV buses. 
• Branch flow sensitivities 
The following figure shows a branch between bus i and bus j. 
The power flow from bus i to bus j can be calculated by 
P. = jv.j 2 G .. _ _!_IVIIV-l(B .. sin0 .. + G .. cos0 .. ) 
11 I 1/ t .. I 1 11 I) 11 11 
11 
where 0 .. = 0. -0. 
I) I 1 
1. The branch flow sensitivities with respect to active and reactive power at busk can be calculated as: 
aP;i aP;j aei aP;i aej aP;j avi aP;j avj - = ----+----+--+----
aPk aei aPk aej aPk avi aPk avj aPk 
aP;j = aP;i aei + aP;j aej + aP;j avi + aP;j avj 
aQk aei aQk aej aQk avi aQk avj aQk 
aP. av aP. av 
If bus i is a PV bus, then there are no items of --11 _i and - 11 __ i . If bus j is a PV bus, then 
avi aPk avi aQk 
aP. av. aP. av. 
h . f I/ 1 d I) J • h b . t ere are no Items o --- -- an ---- mt ea ove equat10ns. 
avj aPk avj aQk 
2. The branch flow sensitivities with respect to voltages (amplitudes) at PV buses can be calculated as 
aP. 
lj 
aP. 
If 
avi 
aP;J 
av. 
J 
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if k = i 
if k = j 
aP. av aP. av. aP ae aP. ae . 
_IJ __ i +-11 __ J +-/' __ i +-/} __ J 
avi avk av1 avk aei avk a01 aek 
o.w. 
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